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 ABSTRACT 
The development of product standards and their widespread adoption can play a vital 
role in facilitating transactions and enhancing trade, both domestically and 
internationally. This paper aims to examine whether mutual recognition of product 
standards could facilitate international trade of organic products. The measure of 
mutual standards used in this thesis is a number of organic equivalency arrangements 
between the United States and five of its trading partners. The relationship is estimated 
by applying Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood and Ordinary Least Squares to the 
gravity model of trade. The data sets include organic trade data between the United 
States and around 60 of its trade partners during 2011-2016. This study does not find 
an effect on imports. However, my findings suggest that there may be a positive 
impact of an equivalence of standards on exports.  
 
Key words: Gravity model, United States, Organic equivalency policies, Organic trade, 
Mutual recognition standards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decades, trade policy reforms together with improved communication 
channels have led to deeper international economic integration. Due to this, 
domestic policies affecting the competitiveness on the world market have become 
more scrutinized. At the same time, concerns regarding environmental damage and 
pollution have become a growing issue. This has led to discussions between policy 
makers on how to slow down the exploitation of world resources and to enforce 
stricter regulations regarding environmental standards. These developments do 
not only affect the domestic market but the entire international marketspace and 
have led to more interlinked trade policies. Product standards play a significant 
role in facilitating transactions and has become more prominent on the agenda in 
international trade policy discussions. Adopting common standards may lead to a 
greater possibility in trade of organic products and reduce trade frictions.  
 
This study contributes to existing research by focusing on the equivalence of 
organic standards rather than the harmonization of standards. More specifically, 
this thesis examines the impact of the organic equivalency arrangements between 
the United States and five of its trade partners. Organic agriculture has experienced 
rapid growth worldwide in recent years. As consumer demand increases, the 
market for organic goods grows bigger every year. Differences in standards and 
certification systems can constitute a barrier to trade and prevent growth of the 
organic import and export market. Transaction costs and concerns about the quality 
of food and logistic procedures are key determinants in organic trade. The 
hypothesis is that the equivalence of organic standards can facilitate international 
trade in organic products. The Organic equivalency arrangements aim to lower the 
barriers to international trade while not compromising with the standards of 
organic products.   
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The aim of this essay is to empirically assess the impact of an equalization of 
standards on trade. This is done by investigating how U.S. imports and exports 
have been influenced by the organic equivalency arrangements with Canada, South 
Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the European Union. The assessment of these agreements 
is done with the help of the gravity equation using the trade pattern with other 
countries as a bench mark. The essay is structured as follows:  Chapter 2 provides 
a background of standards and trade and information of the organic equivalency 
policies. Chapter 3 reviews previous literature related to this field. Chapter 4 covers 
the empirical strategy and provide information about the data sets. Chapter 5 
presents the econometric estimations of the impact of the organic equivalency 
arrangements on organic imports and exports and compare the results obtained 
using different estimation methods. This is followed by a conclusion in Chapter 6. 
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2. STANDARDS AND TRADE 
This chapter present the relationship between standards and international trade, a 
background on U.S. organic trade as well as information about the organic 
equivalency arrangements.  
 
2. 1 WHAT ARE STANDARDS AND WHY DO WE HAVE THEM? 
In the past decades, the importance of bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
has increased as the world becomes more integrated. These types of agreements 
have eliminated some of the barriers to trade but there are still issues concerning 
the facilitation of international trade. Difference in standards are one of these 
obstacles. Standards are different from other trade barriers since the aim is to 
protect against market failures such as negative externalities that could have 
negative implications on people’s health and/or the environment (Chen and Matteo 
2008). Standards are often associated with what the World Trade Organization 
refers to as “Non-Tariff Barriers”. Non-tariff barriers can be divided into two 
subgroups: technical barriers to trade (TBT) and Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures (WTO, 2016, p. 12). TBT cover issues regarding technical regulation, 
conformity assessment procedures and standards. Figure 1 below presents 
information on each subgroup. Both governmental and non-governmental entities 
can develop standards. SPS measures concerns risks threatening “human health 
and animal/plant health or life or protection from pests” (ibid).  
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Figure 1: TBT measures according to the WTO 
Technical regulations Standards Conformity assessment 
Technical regulation is a document 
which lays down product 
characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, 
including the applicable 
administrative provisions. It may 
also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production 
method. 
Standard is a document approved 
by a recognized body, that 
provides, for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for products or 
related processes and production 
methods. It may also include or 
deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they 
apply to a product, process or 
production method. 
Conformity assessment is any 
procedure used, directly or 
indirectly, to determine that 
relevant requirements in technical 
regulations or standards are 
fulfilled. 
Source: (WTO, 2016, p.14) 
 
Regional differences in standards can be horizontal or vertical. An example of 
horizontal differences is a country’s voltage requirement in power outlets and an 
example of vertical differences is the level of pesticides that are allowed in 
production of agricultural goods (Chen and Matteo 2008). Standards could impact 
international trade both positively and negatively. On one hand, production costs 
could increase as producers have to comply with different regulations. The costs 
increases with stricter requirements as the variable costs of production increases 
(WTO, 2005, p.55). As a result, it could have a negative effect on trade. On the other 
hand, it is costly for firms to enter new markets and research information regarding 
necessary requirements. The regulations make the information available on what 
the consumer’s demand which in turn reduce costs. Consumers also know that 
foreign products follow the national standards which can increase demand (ibid). 
 
There are two common methods of reducing the potential negative effects of 
standards on trade: mutual recognition and harmonization of standards (Chen and 
Matteo 2008). The two concepts are related although not identical. Mutual 
recognition is process by which a country recognize that the rules and regulations 
of another country are different but compatible with its own, harmonization is 
when countries converge rules (ibid). The organic equivalency policies is a type of 
mutual recognition agreement and is therefore the procedure that this study focus 
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on. Mutual recognition of standards imply that a product produced in one country 
according to their standards can be sold without altercation to another country and 
vice versa. Common standards reduces asymmetry in product quality and 
simplifies the production and facilitate trade by eliminating costly and inefficient 
costs associated with duplicate testing and certification (WTO, 2015, p. 99). It can 
also promote efficiencies and allow for economies of scale since producers do not 
have to alter their production or labeling processes in order to comply with 
different standards in other market (FAO and WTO, 2017, p. 15). 
 
2.2 U.S. ORGANIC EQUIVALENCY ARRANGEMENTS 
The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 served to establish uniform national 
standards for organic farming in the United States. These regulations cover the 
processing, handling and production of organic agricultural goods (Gold, 2007). 
Products that satisfy the conditions get an USDA organic seal and guarantees the 
consumer that all necessary the requirements are met. The organic regulations was 
implemented in 2002 when the set of standards were fully developed. It was the 
first national legislation implementing a set of uniform standards for the definition 
of “organic” (OTA, 2016b). Prior to 2002, each U.S. state had their own practices 
and “organic” had a different meaning depending on where the certification was 
issued (ibid). An organic producer must demonstrate that they are “protecting 
natural resources, conserving biodiversity, and using only approved crop, livestock 
and processing inputs” ” (OTA, 2016:b) . Once verified, they receive a USDA 
organic certificate and are allowed to label products as “organic”. 
 
The U.S. Organic Equivalency Arrangements aim is to reduce trade barriers in 
organic products and facilitate the sale of organic products between the 
arrangement countries (USDA:g). These trade arrangements give access to 
increased market access for producers and facilitates trade in organic products 
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while still protecting organic standards. It also leads to increased availability and 
variety of organic products for the consumers. The first organic equivalency 
agreement was signed between the United States and Canada in 2009. It was then 
followed by agreements with Taiwan, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and 
Switzerland. All but the one is bilateral. The US-Taiwan arrangement only covers 
exports from the United States to Taiwan. The equivalence agreement with 
Switzerland was implemented in late 2015. Due to its recent effective date, the US-
Switzerland arrangement is excluded from this study. 
 
TABLE 1: ORGANIC EQUIVALENCY AGREEMENTS 
 
County Commencement Type of Agreement 
Canada January 1, 2009 Bilateral 
Taiwan 2009 Unilateral (only exports) 
European Union June 1, 2012 Bilateral 
Japan January1, 2014 Bilateral 
South Korea July 1, 2014 Bilateral 
Table 1 presents the organic equivalency agreements signed with the United States. Table 8 in the 
Appendix provides a summary of the scope and requirements regarding each organic arrangement.  
 
The organic equivalence arrangements are not necessarily identical but they 
acknowledge two systems for organic production as compatible and veritable. In 
general, as long as the products meet the standards set by their respective nation, 
it is allowed to be exported to the other market and vice versa. In other words, 
organic agricultural products in one country are allowed to be sold as organic in 
the other as long as it complies with the origin country’s standards.  The production 
does not have to be modified in order to be sold on the foreign market. Without an 
equivalency agreement, foreign producers that want to export to the U.S. have to 
follow USDA regulations and become certified by an agency recognized by the 
USDA. 
 
Standards and Organic Trade 
7 
 
The market for organic goods in the United States is large. According to a survey 
conducted by the Organic Trade Organization (OTA), sales of organic food 
products in 2016 totaled over $40 billion and is the largest dollar gain recorded in 
that sector (Bizzozero, 2017). It was an increase of 8.4 percent from the previous 
year. Organic non-food sales totaled $4 billion, up 8.8 percent from 2015. 
Furthermore, organic food accounted for 5.3 percent of all food sold in the United 
States 2016. Organic fruits and vegetables are was dominating organic category 
with sales over $15 billion. Organic fruits and vegetables accounts for almost 40 
percent of all organic foods sold in the U.S and 15 percent of the total sales of fruits 
and vegetables (ibid). The supply of organic products is falling behind the 
increasing demand for organic goods (OTA, 2016). Organic equivalency 
arrangement may be a way to mitigate this issue.  
 
Figure 2 presents total value1 of organic imports to/exports from the United States 
during 2011-2016. The trend for U.S. imports display a small increase while the one 
for exports display a decrease. The large drop in exports in 2012 may be explained 
by the drought that affected most of the United States during 2012-2013 (Rippey, 
2015). The drought was one of the worst in American history and severely affected 
the whole agricultural sector, organic products included. The total losses of the 
drought, mostly in agriculture, have been estimated to $30 billion (ibid). The 
negative trend continues until 2015 where we see an increase in exports.  Of all 
organic products used in this study, apples, grapes, spinach, lettuce and 
strawberries top the list of the five most exported products (in monetary value) and 
apples, avocados, coffee (Arabica and Non-Roast Decaffeinated coffee) and 
soybeans are the five most imported. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Total as in the total value of the organic data in this study.  
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FIGURE 2: TOTAL VALUE OF ORGANIC IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN USD 
 
 
 
Figures 3 and 4 display U.S. trade data for organic imports and exports. It is divided 
into regions or single countries that the U.S. has an organic equivalency agreement 
with. Figure 3 show that the main regions the U.S. imports from are Asia and 
Central and South America. Asia is the continent where the increase in trade 
between 2011 and 2016 is the highest. Canada and the EU are the only countries 
with an organic equivalency policy that experienced an increase in organic trade 
during 2011-2016. Furthermore, when comparing between the year of 
implementation and 2016, imports to the U.S. has increased from all policy 
partners. Figure 4 presents the destination countries for U.S. exports. Canada is the 
dominant destination for U.S. organic products. All countries with an organic 
equivalency arrangement with the United States have experienced an increase of 
organic trade during 2011-2016. This trend is unchanged when comparing between 
the year that each policy was implemented and 2016. 
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FIGURE 3: COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN: U.S. IMPORTS 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION:  U.S. EXPORTS 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
ORGANIC IMPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES IN 
MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0
50
100
150
200
250
ORGANIC EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES IN 
MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS. 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Standards and Organic Trade 
10 
 
3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The following chapter presents the results from previous empirical studies 
regarding international standards and trade. 
 
3.1 STANDARDS AND ORGANIC TRADE 
The literature on standards and organic trade is relatively scarce. There are a few 
studies investigating equivalence in standards and international trade in organic 
agricultural products. Canaveroi and Cantore (2010) conduct a gravity model 
analysis on Italian agricultural trade. They examine trade between Italy and extra-
European countries and use the equivalency of organic standards as a proxy for the 
affinity in bilateral trading relationships in the agricultural sector. Their findings 
suggest that countries with dissimilar equivalence in organic standards decreases 
the level of bilateral trade between Italy and non-European countries as trade costs 
are higher. Their results are general for all agricultural products as their data set 
could not distinguish organic foods from non-organic. Studies conducted by 
Kristiansen (2014) and Jaenicke and Demko (2015) use trade data from USDA GATS 
to perform gravity analysis of the organic equivalence agreements effect on organic 
trade. Kristiansen (2014) examines U.S. import data during 2011-2013 for three 
organic crops: wheat, corn, and soy. However, the author does not find that the 
equivalency agreements have an impact on organic imports into the United States. 
The paper by Jaenicke and Demko (2015) conducts a more robust analysis by 
including a greater number of products. The authors use OLS and a negative 
binomial estimation method and find that the organic equivalency arrangement 
increased annual exports with 58 percent. The impact on imports is ambiguous. 
When analyzing imports in 2011’s Harmonized System (HS) organic product codes 
their findings suggest an annual reduction of trade by 45 per cent. However, when 
they include 2013’s HS product codes they find that the organic policies increased 
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annual imports by 110 percent. Oberholtzer et al (2013) find that most of the 
products imported to the United States are often products that cannot be produced 
domestically such as tropical fruits and coffee. A common issue in organic 
international trade is differences in national organic regulation and certification, 
especially for producers in developing countries (Barrett et al 2002). Despite the 
additional costs faced by foreign farms in the developing world of complying with 
complex organic standards, investing in organic certification tends to increase 
revenues as the higher prices of organic foods compensate for the lower output of 
organic farms (Kleemann et al, 2014: Bolwig et al, 2009).  
 
3.2 NON-TARIFF MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
While the literature on standards and international organic trade may be scarce, 
there are several studies investigating the effect on Non-tariff measures (NTM) and 
trade performance. A recent study by Cadot and Gourdon (2016) examines the 
impact of different NTM’s measures on trade performance. They find that mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures have a positive effect on trade. 
They remove the cost of adapting the product to foreign markets as well as gaining 
access to foreign markets. Their findings also indicate that mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment procedures is preferable to harmonization of standards for 
developing regions. Many developing nations lack the necessary safety regulation 
against harmful and poisonous products and could therefore constitute a threat for 
people’s health. A paper by Chen and Matteo (2008) further support these findings. 
Their results suggest that mutual recognition and harmonization of standards have 
a positive impact on the willingness to trade as well as the levels of trade. However, 
they point out that mutual recognition is not viable option if there are significant 
differences in the countries initial standards. Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) 
analyses the trade impact of harmonizing food regulations in the EU. They find that 
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harmonizing food regulation has a large positive effect on intra-EU trade, both at 
aggregate and sub-sector levels of the food industry.  
 
To summarize, previous research indicate that the equivalence of standards have a 
positive impact on organic exports. However, the effect on imports is ambiguous. 
Entering a mutual recognition of standards or conformity assessment agreement 
also suggest that there is a positive relationship between common procedures and 
international trade.  
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This chapter explains the empirical strategy used in this study. In order to 
investigate the organic equivalency agreements effect on organic trade the gravity 
model of trade is used. I provide the intuition of the model and present a general 
and specific application of the model. This is followed by a section providing 
information about the data set and the estimation method.  
 
4.1 THE GRAVITY MODEL OF TRADE 
The Gravity model of trade is widely used in international trade literature in order 
to estimate the impact of trade-related policies. It was first introduced to empirical 
trade research by Tinberger (1962). He used an analogy of Newton’s universal law 
of gravity to describe bilateral trade flows between to geographical units as 
proportional to their masses and inversely related to the distance between them. 
The intuition is that exports are proportional to the trade partners “economic 
mass”, often measured by GDP, and inversely proportional to the distance between 
them (Shepard, 2013). Thus, trade partners with large economies are expected to 
trade more and countries far apart to trade less as trade costs increase with distance. 
Initially, the model experienced criticism of lacking theoretical foundation. 
However, studies by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1989) and Deardorff (1995) have 
provided theoretical support to the model. One of the most standard formulations 
of the gravity model was formulated by Anderson and Van Wincoop: 
 
[1]                                                     𝑋𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
𝑦𝑤
 [
𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗
]
1−𝜎
 
 
Xij denotes the monetary value of trade between country i and j. Yi and Yj are 
country i’s and country j’s GDP and used as a proxy for economic mass.  Yw is 
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world GDP. Pi is the price level in country i. Pj is the price level in country j. τij is a 
measure of trade cost. The most common measure of trade costs is geographical 
distance between two economic units. Other frequently used measures of trade 
costs are dummy variables indicating whether the trade partners share a common 
language or colonial past, if the country is landlocked or if they are in the same 
trade agreement.  
 
4.2 GRAVITY MODEL AND STANDARDS 
Building from a gravity model framework, factors commonly used to explain 
bilateral trade flows in gravity models are assumed to affect organic trade similarly. 
I have expanded τ and included additional variables to incorporate other trade-
related costs and differences in standards. The variables included in the 
specification are frequently used in research using the gravity model2 and are 
described in detail below. I build my specifications on the work of Jaenicke and 
Demko (2015).  The specifications, expressed in its logarithmic form, are as follows:  
 
[2]     ln(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁄ )𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑛 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑗
+  𝛽4 𝑆. 𝐻𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑗
+  𝛽7 𝑂𝑟𝑔. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗 +  𝛾𝑝 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡  
 
[3]      ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐿𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁄ )𝑗 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑛 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑗
+  𝛽4 𝑆. 𝐻𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝑂𝑟𝑔. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗 +  𝛾𝑝 +  𝜏𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑡  
 
                                                 
2 It is also common in gravity analysis to include a dummy variable indication if the trade partners 
share colonial ties/history. However, it is excluded from this study since the US only have colonial 
ties with one of the countries included in this study.  
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See Table 9 in the Appendix for information about the variables and their data 
sources. 𝛽0 is a constant, Ln is the natural logarithm and εijpt  is the error term.  
 
The dependent variables Importsijt and Exportsijt are organic imports to or organic 
exports (p) from the United States (i) to each individual trading partner (j) in year 
t.  It is measured in nominal U.S. Dollars (in thousands).  
 
GDP/capitaj is the trading partners GDP per capita. The economic mass of the trade 
partners has been translated into GDP per capita in nominal US Dollars. It is often 
used as a proxy for the trading partner’s supply (of exports) and demand (for 
imports). The variable is included as it is likely to affect preferences of goods, such 
as the demand for luxury or ordinary goods (Markusen, 2010). Organic products, 
as they are more expensive, fall into the category of luxury goods. Thus, consumer 
income (i.e. GDP per capita) affects demand for organic products which could 
increase levels of organic trade. Hence, richer countries are expected to 
import/export more organic products. The variable is therefore expected to be 
positive in the regressions with U.S. exports as richer countries are more likely to 
import organic foods. The expected coefficient for regressions with U.S. imports is 
unclear and could be either positive or negative since the relationship between the 
production of organic goods and GDP per capita is not straight forward. GDP 
figures are only relevant to include for U.S. trade partners since the destination of 
imports and the origin of exports is the United States. 
 
Distanceij is a variable indicating the bilateral distance in kilometers between the 
two countries largest cities. It is a proxy for trade costs and is expected to be 
negative as trade costs increase with distance.  
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Landlockedj is a dummy variable that is equal to unity if the trade partner is enclosed 
by land. It is intended to capture trade costs and is expected to be negative as 
countries without access to ports are likely to experience higher transportation 
costs. The variable is excluded from the regressions with export data since it only 
contains one country that is landlocked. 
 
NAFTAj is a dummy variable equal to unity if the trade partner is a member of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, and zero otherwise. It can also be 
interpreted as a dummy indicating if the countries share a common border since 
the members of NAFTA share a border with the United States. It is expected to be 
positive as members of the same free trade union (or share a common border) are 
likely to trade more with each other than with other countries as trade barriers and 
transaction costs are lower.  
 
S. Hemispherej is a dummy variable that is set to one if the trade partner is located in 
the Southern Hemisphere. Jaenicke and Demko (2015) includes this variable in their 
study in order to capture the potential effect that opposite growing seasons may 
have on levels of organic trade. Trade with a country with an opposite growing 
seasons could either be positive or negative as it could both stimulate and dampen 
demand depending on reasons such as personal tastes and type of product.  
 
Englishi is a dummy variable that is equal to unity if both countries have English as 
their official language. Sharing a common language is often used as a proxy for 
cultural and historical links and hence, is expected to increase trade levels.  
 
Org.Policyij is the main variable of interest. I have used several specifications. The 
first specification treats all organic equivalency policies as identical policies. In this 
specification it is defined as a dummy variable set to 1 if the trade partner is a 
Policy-country and from its respective year of commencement. For example, the 
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policy variable is set to 1 if the country is Japan, Taiwan (for exports only), South 
Korea, EU and Canada during their effective organic equivalency agreement and 
zero otherwise. The second approach is to treat each organic equivalency policy as 
separate. That is, a separate variable for each country. Since I use annual trade data, 
the EU and South Korea policies will be specified as effective from 2013 and 2015, 
respectively.  
 
I employ two additional data sets that include both organic and non-organic 
products. This allows for a more robust testing of how an equivalence of standard 
impacts organic trade. The data sets cover the top five traded organic products in 
monetary value as well as their non-organic equivalent. It adds another dimension 
to the analysis by allowing for comparison of trade between organic products and 
its conventional counterpart. By only examining the potential change in organic 
trade we may exclude other possible explanations that affects supply or demand 
such as climate conditions or changes in consumer tastes that is expected to affect 
organic and conventional foods similarly. In order to test this I include two 
additional specifications of the Org.Policy variable. The third approach is an 
interaction policy variable set to unity if two conditions apply. 1. If a country has 
an effective organic equivalency arrangement and 2. If the product is organic. The 
fourth specification is a separate interaction policy variable for each organic 
equivalency policy that meet the two conditions above. I will also estimate equation 
(3) and (4) including one additional variable, the target country’s GDP. The reason 
for this is to include a similar version of the gravity equation as the one by 
Anderson and van Wincoop described in section 4.1. 
 
4.3 DATA  
The study is conducted using annual data for U.S. organic import and exports 
during 2011-2016. The unit of analysis used in this study to represent common 
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standards are the organic equivalency arrangements between United States and 
five of its trade partners. The trade data is collected from the United States Foreign 
Agricultural (USDA) Sevice’s Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS). USDA 
GATS collects information on imports to and exports from the United States and its 
trade partners.  The GATS database reports the monetary value of the volume of 
bilateral trade expressed in thousands of U.S. Dollars for organic and non-organic 
agricultural products in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(OTA:a). A problematic issue with analyzing trade in organic products is the lack 
of detailed data. Most internationally recognized organizations that provide trade 
data such as the International Monetary Fund, The Word Bank and Eurostat do not 
distinguish between organic and conventional agricultural products. It was not 
until 2011 that harmonized codes for organic products were first issued. In order 
for an organic product to receive a HS code it has to be traded for more than 1 
million USD annually (Jaenicke and Demko, 2015). In other worlds, the lack of HS 
products codes does not necessarily indicate that there is no organic trade in that 
good. In 2011, only twenty different product groups were reported for imports. In 
general, import data is considered to be reported with better accuracy than exports. 
Due to the small data sample I extend the study to cover exports as well. I include 
a data set containing exports from the 2011’s product groups, which contain more 
data points than imports. Exports are reported in 23 different product groups in 
2011. See table 7 in the Appendix for a list of U.S. export and import products.  
 
I include additional data sets that cover the top 5 traded organic products and its 
non-organic equivalent. It is measured in monetary value and the products are 
mentioned in section 2.2. The non-organic products is gathered from USDA GATS 
database.  
 
Statistics on GDP, population, bilateral distance, as well as different dummy 
variables indicating bilateral similarities and differences were extracted from the 
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Centre d’etudes Prospectived et d’Information Internationales (CEPII) gravity and 
distance databases. The GDP/capita variable is interpolated for 2016 as these 
figures, as of May 2017, had not yet been made available.  
 
Statistics for Serbia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be linked to 
the CEPII’s gravity database and is replaced by statistics from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. Distance and bilateral dummies are in these cases 
calculated by the author. Since CEPII do not aggregate data on geographical or 
economic region, data for European Union is aggregated by the author.  
 
All available trading partners that are found in the USDA GATS database are 
included in the study with two exceptions. Countries that are either too small (e.g. 
small oceanic island) or contain too few observations are excluded. See Table 10 in 
the Appendix for a complete list of the countries included in this study.  
 
4.4 METHOD OF ESTIMATION 
The main estimation method for the baseline gravity equation is a fixed effects 
Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model. A Hausman test has been 
conducted in order to establish weather fixed or random effects should be used in 
the estimations. The result of the Hausman test is found in Figure 5 in the Appendix 
and suggests that a fixed effects estimator is preferred. 
 
I conduct two different fixed effects PPML estimations: PPML with year and 
country-product fixed effects and PPML with year fixed effects and product fixed 
effects. In order to distinguish between the two specifications the former one will 
be referred to as PPML FE and the later PPML. The PPML FE treats data as panel 
and the fixed effects controls for all sources of all time-invariant differences 
between individuals that could explain the level of trade. All time-invariant 
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variables are hence omitted which could be problematic if the variable of interest 
does not change over time. Since the variable of interest in this study do have time-
variation, this approach can be applied. However, since the policy for Canada and 
Taiwan was introduced in 2009 (i.e. prior to when USDA started recording trade 
data on organic products) the policy variables for these countries are omitted when 
using PPML FE. In order to be able to include these policies in my analysis, I 
conduct a general PPML. This approach treats the data as cross-sectional and the 
time-invariant variables does not get omitted. In order to control for time and 
product heterogeneity I include year and product dummies. Furthermore, I include 
a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator for comparison.  
 
The PPML estimators have shown to have many desirable properties for studies 
using gravity models. First, the technique is consistent when using fixed effects. 
Most nonlinear maximum likelihood estimators does not have this property 
(Shepard, 2013, p. 52). Second, the estimator provides consistent parameters in 
presence of heteroscedasticity, and hence could bias the results. This is particularly 
important as heteroscedasticity constitutes a common problem in trade data 
analysis (ibid). Another suggestion to fix the problem of arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity is to include robust standard errors in the regressions (ibid). 
Third, the PPML estimator performs strongly when dealing with data containing 
large numbers zero values (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Naturally, this is 
common in trade data since not all countries trade all products with other countries.   
It is particularly common in organic trade since trade data is relatively scarce3. The 
PPML estimator includes zero values due to its multiplicative form. By using log-
linear models such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) these observations are 
dropped since the logarithm of zero is undefined. This could lead to sample 
selection bias (Shepard, 2013, p. 55). A study by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) 
                                                 
3 USDA GATS is the only database, known to the author, which provides statistics on organic data 
free of charge to the public.  
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provides support that the PPML technique is consistent even in datasets containing 
large numbers of zero values. Lastly, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted 
as elasticities, exactly as in log-linear models. The only difference is that the 
dependent variables (exports and imports) are specified in its original trade value 
rather than the logarithm of trade. Thus, the estimated coefficients of any 
independent variables entered in its logarithmic form can be interpreted as 
elasticities (Shepard, 2013, p. 52).  
 
Some studies that investigate organic trade use alternative estimation methods 
such as the negative binomial model. The reason to why the PPML estimator is 
used, is because the negative binomial model exhibits some undesirable features in 
a trade context. One disadvantage of the negative binomial model is that it is 
sensitive to scale such that the results could differ depending on if the dependent 
variable is in dollars or in thousands of dollars which could be problematic when 
the gravity model is used. (Shepard, 2013, p. 54).  
 
4.5 ZERO TRADE AND MISSING VALUES 
A large number of observations were either reported as zeros or missing values. 
This could constitute an estimation issues as it can bias the estimations. As can be 
seen in Table 2 below, trade data on organic imports have more observations with 
zero values than exports. Thus, trade data for exports is of higher quality which 
should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results.  
 
There are many ways to deal with zero trade flows. A common method in trade 
literature is to use a Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator that does not 
require the observations to be in its logarithmic form. Westerlund and Wilhelmson 
(2011) have found that the PPML model is more efficient than log-linearized models 
when the data contains zero values. There are two commonly used approaches in 
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order to handle zero trade flows in log-linearized models. One option is to drop 
them and another is to add a small constant to the value of trade before taking the 
logarithm (WTO, 2012, p. 112). The former approach may be problematic due to 
loss of information and yield biased estimates if the zeroes are not randomly 
distributed (Heckman, 1979). Thus, the second procedure is used in this study. The 
OLS coefficients could lead to significant biases if the data contains a large number 
of zero trade flows (Santos Silva and Tenreyno, 2006).  Because of this, the main 
focus in this study is on the PPML estimations. 
 
TABLE 2: MISSING VALUES AND ZERO TRADE FLOWS 
 
Dataset Total number 
of obs. 
Missing 
values 
Reported 
as zero 
Total % of obs.  
Organic imports 7220 5286 771 6057 0.73/0.84 
Organic exports 7728 4668 1445 6113 0.61/0.79 
Organic and non-organic 
imports 
3660 2466 362 2887 0.69/0.77 
Organic and non-organic 
exports 
3360 1578 543 2121 0.46/0.63 
In the last column (% of obs), the figure to the left display missing values as a percentage of all 
observations and the figure to the right display the sum of missing values and zero trade flows as 
a percentage of all observations. 
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5. RESULTS 
In this chapter the results from the various regressions and robustness tests are 
presented and discussed. 
5.1 IMPORTS 
The results are found in Table 3 below. The results from the first group of 
regressions (1-3) on organic imports data set are ambiguous. The results for the 
explanatory variable of interest, Org.Policy, is negative in all but one, the OLS, 
estimation. However, neither of the two PPML estimations is statistically 
significant. The second group of regressions (displayed as regressions 4-6) is 
performed using the same data. The only difference is that each policy is treated 
separately. The results are similar, the only difference is that the estimate of the 
South Korea policy in the PPML regression suggests a large negative and 
significant effect. The other Policy variables are negative, but not significant, except 
for the OLS estimates.  However, the reason to the ambiguous results may be due 
to the poor quality of the organic imports data.  
 
The estimated coefficients of the trade partners bilateral distance, membership of 
NAFTA and if the country is enclosed by land are statistically significant and 
consistent with theory. GDP per capita is positive in all but the two PPML FE 
regressions. According to theory it could be either positive or negative. The variable 
indicating if the country is located in the Southern Hemisphere and if the trade 
partners have English as their official language is mostly positive which is in line 
with theory. However, neither is statistically significant.  
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TABLE 3. ORGANIC IMPORTS 
 
Dependent variable: 
Organic imports 
PPML (1) PPML FE 
(2) 
OLS (3) PPML (4) PPML FE 
(5) 
OLS  (6) 
Ln GDP/cap 0.017 -0.459 0.084*** -0.015 -0.465 0.041*   
 (0.05) (0.42) (0.02) (0.05) (0.42) (0.02)    
Ln Distance -0.853***  -0.588*** -0.907***  -0.556*** 
 (0.12)  (0.06) (0.14)  (0.06)    
NAFTA 1.133***  1.630*** 1.237***  1.875*** 
 (0.24)  (0.29) (0.23)  (0.37)    
S.Hemisphere 0.373  0.069 0.384  0.058    
 (0.20)  (0.06) (0.20)  (0.06)    
Landlocked -1.756***  -0.222*** -1.762***  -0.262*** 
 (0.30)  (0.05) (0.30)  (0.05)    
English -0.060  0.115 0.090  0.095    
 (0.27)  (0.06) (0.29)  (0.06)    
Org Policy (any) -0.420 -0.268 1.261***                      
 (0.31) (0.29) (0.22)                      
Canada    -0.768  0.988*   
    (0.42)  (0.48)    
EU    0.696 -0.160 3.340*** 
    (0.41) (0.33) (0.35)    
Japan    0.162 -0.467 0.255    
    (0.56) (0.34) (0.34)    
S.Korea    -4.070*** -0.480 -0.243    
    (0.63) (0.62) (0.26)    
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Country-product fixed 
effects No Yes No No Yes No 
constant 13.567*** 5.129*** 14.289*** 5.216*** 
 (1.15)  (0.58) (1.30)  (0.58)    
R-sqr   0.183   0.196    
Obs 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 denotes level of significance. Robust standard errors are presented within 
parenthesis. The dependent variable is organic imports in nominal US Dollars in all cases except for the 
OLS regression where the natural log of imports is used. Estimates from the three models of which the OLS 
is specified as the natural logarithm as in equation 2 and the PPML and PPML FE is in its multiplicative 
form. All policies treated the same in regression 1-3 and separate in regressions 4-6. EU refer to the 
European Union’s 28 member countries. 
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5.2 EXPORTS 
The results from the first group of regressions (7-9 in Table 4 below) of the organic 
exports data set indicates that there may be positive trade effect when entering an 
organic equivalency agreement. However, it is only statistically significant in the 
OLS and the general PPML cases. When country fixed effects is included, as in 
PPML FE, the positive relationship is no longer clear. We cannot rule out that the 
positive trade effects in PPML and OLS may reflect supply effects, i.e. that some 
countries produce and supplies a larger quantity and variation of organic products 
than others.  
 
The second group of regressions (10-12) is similar to the first, the only difference is 
that each organic trade agreement is treated as separate. All but the Canada policy 
are positive in the PPML regression. The positive trade effect is statistically 
significant for all but the EU. However, since the PPML FE estimation is not 
statistically different from zero, we cannot disregard that the positive trade gain in 
the PPML estimations reflects supply effects.  
 
The majority of the remaining explanatory variables are consistent with theory, the 
only variable that largely differs the theoretical expectation is Distance. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that there is a significant positive relationship 
between distance and trade volume. I cannot find an explanation for this result 
other than that it may capture some positive trade effect unknown to me.   
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TABLE 4: ORGANIC EXPORTS 
 
Dependent variable: 
Organic exports 
PPML (7) PPML FE 
(8) 
OLS (9) PPML (10) PPML 
FE (11) 
OLS (12) 
Ln GDP/cap 0.452*** 2.138 0.213*** 0.584*** 2.198 0.241*** 
 (0.06) (1.39) (0.02) (0.06) (1.57) (0.02)    
Ln Distance  2.246***  0.220*** 1.148***  0.165*** 
 (0.36)  (0.03) (0.25)  (0.03)    
NAFTA 7.921***  5.364*** 6.885***  5.757*** 
 (0.68)  (0.17) (0.48)  (0.21)    
S. Hemisphere -0.022  -0.236*** -0.221  -0.236*** 
 (0.26)  (0.04) (0.26)  (0.04)    
English -0.844**  0.166*** 0.352  0.243*** 
 (0.26)  (0.05) (0.19)  (0.05)    
Org. Policy (any) 1.219*** 0.608 2.125***                      
 (0.27) (0.47) (0.14)    
Canada    -0.466  1.124*** 
    (0.45)  (0.30)    
S. Korea    1.674*** 0.495 1.746*** 
    (0.48) (0.43) (0.41)    
Taiwan    2.176***  2.813*** 
    (0.25)  (0.24)    
EU    0.047 0.424 1.308*** 
    (0.42) (0.52) (0.27)    
Japan    2.632*** 0.689 2.850*** 
    (0.40) (0.65) (0.36)    
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Country-product fixed 
effects No Yes No No Yes No 
       
constant -18.916*** -1.598*** -10.459*** -1.387*** 
 (3.78)  (0.35) (2.55)  (0.35)    
R-sqr   0.457   0.463    
Obs 7728 7728 7728 7728 7728 7728 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 denotes level of significance. Robust standard errors are presented 
within parenthesis. The The dependent variable is organic exports in nominal US Dollars in all 
cases except for the OLS regression where the natural log of exports is used. Estimates from the 
three models of which the OLS is specified as the natural logarithm as in equation 3 and the PPML 
and PPML FE is in its multiplicative form. All policies are treated as equal in regressions 7-9 and 
as separate in regressions 10-12. EU refer to the European Union’s 28 member countries. 
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5.3 ROBUSTNESS CONTROL  
 
5.3.1 ROBUSTNESS TEST I: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC IMPORTS 
I use additional specifications and data sets in order to test the robustness of the 
results. The first method is to include additional data sets to compare organic and 
conventional products. I perform six additional regressions. In regressions 16-18 
the organic policies with Japan, Korea and Taiwan are excluded since many data 
points are missing and would produce misleading results. Since PPML FE only 
provides estimations of time-varying variables, the Canadian policy gets omitted. 
Hence, the PPML FE (14) and (17) regressions only gives us an estimate of the EU 
policy. As seen in Table 5 the results are ambiguous. The estimated policy 
coefficients vary greatly among the different approaches and specifications. A 
reason to why the additional non-organic data does not provide a more robust 
result may be that the organic trade data is not sufficient enough. The other 
estimated coefficients are stronger and has a higher level of significance as in Table 
4. The estimated coefficient of English in the PPML estimations is the only variable 
that differs from theory.  
 
 
TABLE 5: REGRESSION OUTPUT: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC IMPORTS 
 
Org. and non-org 
imports 
PPML (13) PPML FE 
(14) 
OLS (15) PPML 
(16) 
PPML FE 
(17) 
OLS (18) 
Org. Policy (any) -0.052 0.497 0.101    
EU    -0.256 0.497 2.841*** 
Japan       
Canada    0.080  -1.332    
S. Korea       
Taiwan       
Estimates from the three models of which the OLS is specified as the natural logarithm as in 
Equation 2 and the PPML and PPMLE FE is in its multiplicative form. In regressions 13-15, the 
variable of interest is specified as the third approach described in section 4.2 under Org.Policyij. and 
16-18 as the fourth. EU refers to the European Union’s 28 member countries. In regressions 16-18 
the organic policies with Japan, Korea and Taiwan are excluded since many data points are missing 
and would produce misleading results. For a complete table of the regression output, see Table 11 
in the Appendix. 
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5.3.2 ROBUSTNESS TEST II: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC EXPORTS 
I performed the same regressions as described in section 5.3.1 but with organic and 
non-organic exports. When comparing with non-organic products, the estimates 
suggest that organic exports has increased. The estimates of all six regressions are 
positive, only some of them statistically significant. PPML FE is the estimator that 
provides the strongest results as it incorporates all fixed effects. The Policy 
coefficient in regression 20 has a significant positive elasticity of 0.615 which 
suggest that entering an organic equivalency agreement increases U.S. exports by 
67.2 percent on average4. When treating each policy separately in regression 22-24, 
the estimated policy effect is still positive and significant most cases. The PPML FE 
indicates that the EU, Japan and South Korea policies have had a positive effect on 
organic trade. The US-Japanese policy is the only that is statistically significant in 
all models. The results from regression 23 indicate that the EU and South Korea 
arrangements have the largest, and most robust, impact. The estimated impact on 
organic trade is a 60.1 and a 400 percentage increase respectively. The estimation of 
the impact from the South Korea policy may seem unrealistically large. However, 
as seen in Figure 4 in section 2.2, the monetary value of exports to Korea is low 
compared to other regions. Hence, it only takes a relatively small increase of 
exports (in monetary value) to make up 400 percent.  
 
The positive and statistically significant results of the PPML FE regressions suggest 
that there may be a positive impact of an equivalence of standards on organic 
exports. This is further supported by the fact that the data set only includes the 
most important products as they are less likely to be influenced by idiosyncratic 
behavior.  
 
 
                                                 
4 In order to calculate the percentage change I use the following expression: 100[exp(c)-1] where c 
is the estimated coefficient.   
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TABLE 6: REGRESSION OUTPUT: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC EXPORTS 
Org and non-org 
Exports 
PPML (19) PPML FE 
(20) 
OLS (21) PPML 
(22) 
PPML FE 
(23) 
OLS 
(24) 
Org. Policy (any) 0.412 0.615* 1.750***    
EU    0.400 0.474** 1.246*   
Japan    1.400** 0.340* 2.011*   
Canada    0.384  1.703*** 
S. Korea    0.900 1.608*** 0.932    
Taiwan    0.421  2.226*** 
Estimates from the three models of which the OLS is specified as the natural logarithm as in 
Equation 3 and the PPML and PPMLE FE is in its multiplicative form. In regressions 19-21, the 
variable of interest is specified as the third approach described in section 4.2 under Org.Policyij. and 
in 22-24 as the fourth. EU refers to the European Union’s 28 member countries. For a complete table 
of the regression output, see table 12 in the Appendix. 
 
 
5.3.3 ROBUSTNESS TEST III AND IV: ADDING A GDP VARIABLE 
I perform a second type of robustness control by adding a GDP variable to equation 
[2] and [3]. GDP is a common variable used in the gravity equation to denote 
economic mass of a country.  I perform regressions with organic and conventional 
products and the results can be found in Table 13 and 14 in the Appendix. The 
results are similar to Robustness test I and II. Organic imports do not seem to have 
increased due to the organic equivalency policies. The results for organic export is 
ambiguous and depends on what fixed effects is used. The most robust result of the 
two PPML estimations is obtained from PPML FE (32) and suggests an increase of 
exports with 83.7 percent when treating all policies as equal. The other explanatory 
variables are in line with the findings in Robustness test I and II.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether mutual agreements of product 
standards can facilitate trade. It is analyzed by examining the U.S. organic 
equivalency agreements effect on bilateral trade. This analysis is driven by a 
balanced data set covering 57 and 60 countries respectively during 2011-2016. Due 
to a large number of zero values, I employ fixed effects Pseudo-Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood model to the gravity equation.  
 
Entering a mutual recognition of standards agreement have an ambiguous effect 
on trade. This study cannot find that imports to the U.S. has increased due to the 
organic equivalency arrangements. The poor quality of the import data could 
explain the lack of result of these regressions. The impact on organic exports are 
unclear and depends on what fixed effects is used. The positive trade effect for 
organic exports becomes stronger when conducting robustness estimations with 
additional data sets and different variable definitions. The most robust results from 
exports is found when I compare organic products with conventional products. The 
positive effect on organic exports is an indicator that there may be a trade gain from 
entering a mutual recognition of standards agreement. The findings in this study 
are in line with previous research. U.S. imports tends to be relatively unaffected by 
equivalence in product standards while exports seems to have increased 
(Kristiansen [2014); Jaenicke and Demko (2015)]. Studies on TBT measures and 
trade suggest that there should be an increase in trade when entering a mutual 
recognition of standards agreement. However, this study cannot find a general 
trade effect of adopting an equivalency agreement of standards.  
 
The demand for organic products have resulted in supply shortages in the United 
States. The U.S. has become increasingly dependent on organic imports to fill the 
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gap between domestic supply and consumer demand. There are potential welfare 
gains for both the producer and consumer by entering a mutual recognition of 
standards agreement. The producers gain access to larger markets and are able to 
scale up their production. The consumers experience higher availability, more 
varieties and lower prices as a result. The issues concerning the U.S. supply of 
organic goods can also be reduced if organic imports acts as substitute for the 
domestic supply. Although the impact of the organic equivalency arrangements is 
unclear, it is possible that the organic arrangements entail positive externalities that 
are difficult to measure such as contributing to improved soil quality and lower 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, this not investigated in this paper but would 
be interesting to study further. Furthermore, as organic trade data continue to be 
collected by USDA GATS a more thorough analysis may be possible in the future. 
Future research with more data points ranging over a longer time period will 
improve the analysis of the organic equivalency arrangements impact on trade.  
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8. APPENDIX 
TABLE 7: HS ORGANIC PRODUCTS 
ORGANIC EXPORTS (2011) ORGANIC IMPORTS (2011) 
1. Potatoes 
2. Cherry Tomatoes 
3. Roma Tomatoes 
4. Tomatoes, Other 
5. Onion Sets 
6. Cauliflower 
7. Broccoli 
8. Head Lettuce 
9. Lettuce, Other 
10. Carrots 
11. Celery 
12. Peppers 
13. Spinach 
14. Oranges 
15. Lemons 
16. Grapes 
17. Apples 
18. Pears And Quinces 
19. Cherries 
20. Strawberries 
21. Blueberries 
22. Coffee 
23. Tomato Sauce 
1. Peppers, Sweet Bell 
2. Peppers - Other 
3. Hass- Like Avocados 
4. Apples 
5. Pears And Quinces 
6. Pears And Quinces - Other 
7. Blueberries 
8. Coffee, Arabica 
9. Coffee - Not Decaf, Not Roasted 
10. Coffee, Decaf Not Roasted 
11. Coffee, Roasted, Not Decaf <2Kg 
12. Coffee, Roasted, Not Decaf 
13. Coffee, Decaf.  <2Kg 
14. Green Tea Flavored <3Kg 
16. Green Tea Not Flavored <3Kg 
17. Green Tea Not Flavored, Other <3Kg 
18. Black Tea <3 KG 
19. Durum Wheat 
20. Rice 
21. Soybeans 
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TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF ORGANIC EQUIVALENCY AGREEMENTS 
 
Canada 
 
Scope. The equivalence arrangement includes all USDA organic products, whether they 
are produced and certified in the U.S. or around the world. USDA-authorized certifying 
agents may not certify Canada-based operations to USDA organic standards. 
 
In order to be sold, labeled, or represented as organic in Canada, USDA organic products 
must meet the following additional requirements. 
 
Agricultural products produced with the use of sodium nitrate shall not be sold or 
marketed as organic in Canada. 
 
Agricultural products produced by hydroponic or aeroponic production methods shall 
not be sold or marketed as organic in Canada. 
 
Agricultural products derived from animals (with the exception of ruminants) must be 
produced according to livestock stocking rates as set out in CAN /CGSB32.310-2006 
S. Korea 
 
Scope. Beginning July 1, 2014, the arrangement covers products which: 
 
 Are certified to the USDA or Korean organic regulations 
 Are “processed products” as defined by the Korean Food Code 
 Contain at least 95 percent organic ingredients 
 Have their final processing (as defined in the Korean Food Code) occur in the U.S. 
or Korea 
 U.S. products: do not contain apples or pears produced with the use of antibiotics 
 Korean products: do not contain livestock products produced with the use of 
antibiotics 
Japan 
 
Scope: Beginning January 1, 2014, all certified organic plant and plant based processed 
products that are produced in the U.S. and Japan, or which have final processing, 
packaging, or labeling in the U.S. or Japan, may access either market. Other USDA-
certified organic products, such as meat, dairy products, and alcoholic beverages, continue 
to enjoy access to both markets. 
European 
Union 
 
Scope. Beginning June 1, 2012, the equivalence arrangement only covers products 
exported from and certified in the United States or the European Union. 
 
Requirements. The following limitations apply to organic agricultural products traded 
under the arrangement: 
  
The following U.S. organic products may not be exported to the EU 
 Crops produced using antibiotics (streptomycin for fire blight control in apples 
and pears). 
The following EU organic products may not be exported to the U.S. 
 Agricultural products derived from animals treated with antibiotics. 
 Aquatic animals (e.g. fish, shellfish). 
Taiwan 
 
Scope. The trade arrangement includes all USDA organic products produced in the United 
States or its territories. USDA organic products produced outside the United States are not 
included in this arrangement. 
 
Further information about the organic equivalency agreements can found at the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s website.  
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDAb-f). 
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TABLE 9: VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION 
Organic and non-organic 
imports 
Imports in nominal US Dollars. Data Source: USDA (2017).  
Organic and non-organic 
Exports 
Exports in (nominal) thousands of US Dollars. Data Source: 
USDA (2017). 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in nominal US dollars. Source: CEPII (2017a), 
The World Bank (2017). 
GDP  GDP in nominal US dollars. Source: CEPII (2017a), The World 
Bank (2017). 
Distance Bilateral distance between two trading partners expressed in 
kilometers between the largest cities in each country. Source: 
CEPII (2017b) 
English Dummy variable that is equal to one if two countries share 
English as their official language. Source: CEPII (2017a) 
Landlocked Dummy variable that is equal to one if a country is enclosed by 
land. Only for imports since only (1) country in the export data 
set is landlocked. Source: CEPII (2017a) 
NAFTA Dummy variable that is equal to one if a country is a member of 
NAFTA, i.e. Canada and Mexico. Source: Made by author.  
S. Hemisphere Dummy variable that is equal to one if a country is located in the 
Southern Hemisphere. It is to capture the potential effect 
different growing seasons can have on trade. Source: Made by 
author.  
Org. Policy 1. Dummy variable that is equal to one if a country has an 
organic equivalency agreement with the United States and from 
the year of its commencement and onwards.  
2. Separate dummy variable for each effective agreement. 
3. An interaction dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
product is organic, if a country has an organic equivalency 
agreement with the United States, from the year of its 
commencement and onwards.  
4. Separate dummy variables for each effective organic 
agreement. The conditions in (3) need to be satisfied.  
Source: Made by Author. 
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TABLE 10: DESTINATION AND ORIGIN COUNTRIES 
 
U.S. EXPORTS U.S. IMPORTS 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belize 
Brazil 
Cambodia 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
European Union 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Korea, South 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Lebanon 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Qatar 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Suriname 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Brazil 
Cambodia 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Democratic Republic of  
the Congo 
Republic of the Congo 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
European Union 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
South Korea 
 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Nepal 
New 
Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Serbia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Taiwan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Uruguay 
Vietnam 
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FIGURE 5: HAUSMAN TEST 
 
A Hausman test is a commonly used for panel data in order to test whether fixed 
or random test should be used. The null hypothesis is that a random effects 
estimator is an appropriate estimator of the true parameter value. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the fixed effects model is appropriate. As seen in below, the p-
value is 0.00 and the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, a fixed effects estimator is 
preferred.   
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TABLE 11. ROBUSTNESS I: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC IMPORTS 
 
Dependent variable: Organic 
and non-organic imports 
PPML (13) PPML 
FE (14) 
OLS (15) OLS (16) PPML FE 
(17) 
PPML 
(18) 
Ln GDP/cap 0.052 0.017 -0.038 0.052 0.017 -0.069    
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.04) (0.07) (0.26) (0.04)    
Ln Distance -1.328***  -1.920*** -1.327***  -1.930*** 
 (0.17)  (0.12) (0.17)  (0.12)    
NAFTA 1.815***  2.293*** 1.815***  2.686*** 
 (0.40)  (0.49) (0.40)  (0.54)    
S.Hemisphere 1.612***  0.850*** 1.612***  0.847*** 
 (0.20)  (0.13) (0.20)  (0.13)    
Landlocked -1.549***  -0.294* -1.549***  -0.307**  
 (0.24)  (0.12) (0.24)  (0.12)    
English -1.795***  0.472*** -1.802***  0.506*** 
 (0.35)  (0.12) (0.35)  (0.12)    
Org Policy (any) -0.052 0.497 0.101                     
 (0.39) (0.66) (0.42)                     
E1    -0.256 0.497 2.841*** 
    (0.52) (0.66) (0.71)    
C1    0.080  -1.332    
    (0.45)  (0.89)    
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Country-product fixed 
effects No Yes No No Yes No 
       
constant 18.640*** 18.169*** 18.633*** 18.517*** 
 (1.78)  (1.20) (1.78)  (1.20)    
R-sqr   0.297   0.301    
Obs 3660 3660 3660 3660 3660 3660 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 denotes level of significance. Robust standard errors are presented 
within parenthesis. The dependent variable is imports to the U.S. measured in millions of US 
Dollars of the five most traded organic products (in monetary value) and its non-organic 
equivalent except for the OLS regressions where the natural log of imports is used. All policies 
treated the same in regression 13-15 and separate in regressions 16-18.  EU covers the European 
Union’s 28 member countries. In regressions 16-18 the organic policies with Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan are excluded since too many data points are missing and would produce misleading 
results.  
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TABLE 12:  ROBUSTNESS II: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC EXPORTS 
 
Dependent variable: 
Organic and non-organic 
exports 
PPML 
(19) 
PPML FE 
(20) 
OLS (21) PPML 
(22) 
PPML FE 
(23) 
OLS (24) 
Ln GDP/cap 0.243*** -0.018 0.438*** 0.243*** -0.028 0.444*** 
 (0.04) (0.20) (0.03) (0.04) (0.20) (0.03)    
Ln Distance 0.971***  0.231** 0.970***  0.225**  
 (0.14)  (0.08) (0.14)  (0.08)    
NAFTA 4.337***  6.567*** 4.340***  6.572*** 
 (0.23)  (0.38) (0.23)  (0.43)    
S.Hemisphere -0.612**  -0.826*** -0.609**  -0.823*** 
 (0.19)  (0.11) (0.19)  (0.11)    
English 0.957***  0.019 0.962***                  
 (0.12)  (0.11) (0.12)                  
Org Policy (any) 0.412 0.615* 1.750***                   
 (0.28) (0.26) (0.29)                   
EU    0.400 0.474** 1.246*   
    (0.41) (0.17) (0.60)    
Japan    1.400** 0.340* 2.011*   
    (0.46) (0.16) (0.91)    
Canada    0.384  1.703*** 
    (0.29)  (0.50)    
S. Korea    0.900 1.608*** 0.932    
    (0.77) (0.08) (1.05)    
Taiwan    0.421  2.226*** 
    (0.35)  (0.46)    
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Country-product fixed 
effects No Yes No No Yes No 
       
constant -2.849*  0.372 -2.831*  0.374    
 (1.21)  (0.81) (1.22)  (0.81)    
R-sqr   0.512   0.513    
Obs 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360 3360 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 denotes level of significance. Robust standard errors are presented 
within parenthesis. The dependent variable is exports from the U.S. measured in millions of US 
Dollars of the five most traded organic products (in monetary value) and its non-organic 
equivalent except for the OLS regressions where the natural log of exports is used. All policies 
treated the same in regression 19-21 and separate in regressions 22-24. EU refers to the European 
Unions 28 member countries.  
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TABLE 13: R OBUSTNESS III: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC IMPORTS 
 
Dependent variable: Org. 
and non-org. imports 
PPML (25) PPML FE 
(26) 
OLS (27) OLS (28) PPML FE 
(29) 
OLS   (30) 
Ln GDP 0.329*** 1.003 0.398*** 0.329*** 1.003 0.389*** 
 (0.06) (4.01) (0.04) (0.06) (4.01) (0.04)    
Ln GDP/cap -0.231** -0.993 -0.351*** -0.231** -0.993 -0.377*** 
 (0.07) (3.97) (0.05) (0.07) (3.97) (0.05)    
Ln Distance -1.330***  -2.139*** -1.329***  -2.140*** 
 (0.19)  (0.12) (0.19)  (0.12)    
NAFTA 1.200**  1.591** 1.199**  1.891*** 
 (0.42)  (0.49) (0.42)  (0.55)    
S.Hemisphere 1.231***  0.849*** 1.231***  0.849*** 
 (0.21)  (0.13) (0.21)  (0.13)    
Landlocked -1.284***  0.174 -1.283***  0.149    
 (0.24)  (0.12) (0.24)  (0.12)    
English -1.532***  0.436*** -1.545***  0.458*** 
 (0.32)  (0.12) (0.32)  (0.12)    
       
Org Policy (any) -0.098 0.531 -0.151                     
 (0.38) (0.66) (0.42)                     
EU    -0.474 0.531 2.492*** 
    (0.52) (0.66) (0.71)    
Canada    0.149  -1.086    
    (0.45)  (0.89)    
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Product fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Country-product fixed 
effects No Yes No No Yes No 
       
constant 12.758*** 12.631*** 12.744*** 13.102*** 
 (2.75)  (1.33) (2.75)  (1.32)    
R-sqr   0.321   0.324    
Obs 3660 3660 3660 3660 3660 3660 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 denotes level of significance. One additional variable, GDP, is 
included in the regressions. Robust standard errors are presented within parenthesis.The 
dependent variable is imports to the U.S. measuured in millions of US Dollars of the five most 
traded organic products (in monetary value) and its non-organic equivalent except for the OLS 
regressions where the natural log of imports is used. All policies treated the same in regression 25-
27 and separate in regressions 28-30. EU covers the European Union’s 28 member countries. In 
regressions 16-18 the organic policies with Japan, Korea and Taiwan are excluded since too many 
data points are missing and would produce misleading results. 
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TABLE 14:  ROBUSTNESS IV: ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC EXPORTS 
 
Dependent variable: Org. 
and non-org. exports 
PPML (31) PPML FE 
(32) 
OLS (33) PPML (34) PPML FE 
(35) 
OLS  (36)  
Ln GDP 0.298*** 1.309 0.259*** 0.299*** 1.266 0.257*** 
 (0.03) (1.35) (0.03) (0.03) (1.35) (0.03)    
Ln GDP/cap 0.109** -1.301 0.316*** 0.111** -1.269 0.323*** 
 (0.04) (1.34) (0.04) (0.04) (1.34) (0.04)    
Ln Distance 0.642***  -0.196* 0.634***  -0.177*   
 (0.18)  (0.09) (0.18)  (0.09)    
NAFTA 3.452***  5.540*** 3.435***  5.543*** 
 (0.29)  (0.39) (0.29)  (0.45)    
S.Hemisphere -0.668***  -1.008*** -0.668***  -0.982*** 
 (0.19)  (0.11) (0.19)  (0.11)    
English 1.069***  0.191 1.068***                  
 (0.13)  (0.11) (0.13)                  
       
Org Policy (any) 0.330 0.658* 1.427***                   
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.30)                   
EU    -0.365 0.509** 0.457    
    (0.38) (0.18) (0.61)    
Japan    0.765 0.392* 1.358    
    (0.46) (0.16) (0.91)    
Canada    0.334  1.714*** 
    (0.29)  (0.50)    
S. Korea    0.575 1.629*** 0.551    
    (0.77) (0.09) (1.05)    
Taiwan    0.418  2.129*** 
    (0.35)  (0.46)    
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Counutry-product fixed 
effexts No Yes No No Yes No 
       
constant -6.470***  -1.318 -6.451***  -1.478    
 (1.56)  (0.81) (1.56)  (0.81)    
R-sqr   0.523   0.524    
Obs       
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 denotes level of significance. One additional variable, GDP, is included 
in the regressions. Robust standard errors are presented within parenthesis. The dependent variable 
is exports from the U.S. measured in millions of US Dollars of the five most traded organic products 
(in monetary value) and its non-organic equivalent except for the OLS regressions where the natural 
log of exports is used. All policies treated the same in regression 31-33 and separate in regressions 
34-36. EU refers to the European Union’s 28 member countries. 
 
